Reflections on the theme of equality in cultural policies

Emmanuel Négrier
Photo: Vincent Pereira – PIXPRO

(Text of the lecture presented at the DEPART project seminar on July 9, 2024)

I am pleased to share my reflections on the topic of equality in cultural policies. I believe equality in cultural policies is a matter of great importance, both for the academic world and for cultural stakeholders. My starting point will therefore be an international comparative study on cultural policy paradigms. This reflection was carried out within the framework of a research project funded by the European Union (UNCHARTED), involving around ten European countries.

First, it is important to note that, compared to other public policies, cultural policies are marked by a rather peculiar characteristic. I will then show how the core paradigms or fundamental values promoted by cultural policies come into conflict when it comes to the concept of equality. Finally, I will analyze how, in the French context, the cultural program of the National Rally party (Rassemblement National, a far-right political party) can be examined through the lens of equality. Altogether, this will serve to illustrate the contemporary challenges of cultural democracy.

To begin with, I will place the issue of equality at the heart of a broader reflection on cultural policy paradigms. Since Peter Hall’s work on paradigm shifts in public policy, the role of ideas in governmental action has been re-evaluated. However, the focus has often been on analyzing and explaining change. The central question is: why and how do public policy paradigms change?

When we look at how paradigms shift in the cultural policy sector, we quickly notice a unique specificity. In many other fields (agriculture, defense, economy, healthcare, etc.), a paradigm shift typically involves the replacement of one paradigm with another. For example, in agriculture, there was a move from a maintenance-based paradigm (low levels of mechanization, mixed farming, etc.) to one of industrialization (land concentration and mechanization), a model now being challenged by environmental and social concerns. In contrast, in the cultural sector, paradigm shifts tend not to replace previous models but rather accumulate upon them. This is where the question of equality becomes particularly relevant. Initially, the dominant paradigm was based on the idea of artistic excellence. But toward the end of the 20th century, other concepts or models emerged: cultural democratization, the creative economy, cultural diversity, and cultural democracy. More recently, the far-right has sought to promote a form of cultural-national sovereignty.

Unlike other sectors of public policy, all these paradigms coexist within the debate over cultural policies. Leaders of major institutions still believe in the superiority of artistic excellence; public administration professionals and political representatives often assert that cultural democratization is a priority; and emerging cultural actors and community-based agents emphasize the importance of cultural democracy, cultural rights, and diversity. Meanwhile, the cultural industries push for a creative economy model. Cultural policy, therefore, becomes a constant and evolving negotiation between these paradigms—with equality at its very core.

Each group of actors champions its own model, defending the superiority of its paradigm in terms of political and social value. This creates a negotiation between a plurality of values—a productive tension that helps shape the relationship between culture and society. The goal is to build society through culture. This tension exists at all levels of governance—national, regional, urban—and in all countries. In the UNCHARTED project, we highlighted Hungary as an exception. There, building society through culture is centered on two pillars: economic neoliberalism, through the privatization of cultural institutions, and a mythical vision of Hungarian cultural homogeneity, promoted through a nationalist cultural agenda.

Within the conflict driven by these competing paradigms, we can clearly see a double inequality. On one hand, paradigms of artistic excellence continue to dominate major cultural institutions and ministerial agendas. On the other, democratization paradigms tend to prevail at the regional cultural administration level. In most cases, these two paradigms overshadow cultural rights and cultural democracy, with the possible exception of some urban local cultural initiatives.

This double inequality can be described as follows:

• Certain paradigms are structurally marginalized, while others dominate the political agenda. This is the first form of inequality and explains the ongoing tensions within the instrumental debate on cultural policy.
• It is always the paradigms that aim most ambitiously to equalize social access to culture that wield the least influence over the political agenda. This helps explain the persistent questioning of the legitimacy of cultural policies and of the role of culture in society.

To conclude, a few words on the distinctive nature of the far-right’s cultural program, using France as a case study. On one hand, in terms of how it conceives of the cultural sector, the far-right’s vision is heavily focused on the heritage subsector. What they promote is a literally “reactionary” vision of heritage:

• A limited view that emphasizes physical buildings over the diversity of intangible heritage;
• The use of financial and tax tools to strengthen the position of property owners;
• The evocation of heritage as a means to reinforce a timeless French identity.

On the other hand, their approach is neoliberal: it proposes the privatization of public broadcasting. Their overall discourse focuses on supporting “proven” successes and abandoning any efforts to transform public taste or promote new artistic discoveries. The far-right is consistently hostile toward contemporary art (“no one understands it”) and toward diverse cultures (particularly rap and hip-hop, except in their nationalist iterations). This is a neoliberal project because it puts the individual at the center of legitimate taste. However, these tastes are shaped by social and cultural capital, which are unequally distributed across society. Thus, this neoliberal project is also deeply unequal.

Finally, the far-right’s cultural program is highly politicized. In territories where they hold power, they actively undermine the professional autonomy of cultural administrators in order to align cultural choices with nationalist and populist positions. Today’s far-right is post-Gramscian in the sense that it sees culture as a potential lever for achieving hegemony. But the model is also highly questionable for at least two reasons:

• Its neoliberal vision is economically very risky;
• Sociological research on taste shows that the value people place on cultural experiences is closely tied to discovery and sharing—two values that directly contradict the populist project.

Inequality in cultural policy thus acts as a threefold driver: it drives tension and negotiation between paradigms, it fuels questioning of the legitimacy of cultural policies, and it serves as a rallying point against populist cultural agendas.